must rely on the Coinbase transfer API, with all its licensed restrictions and limitations [https://coinbase.com/legal/user_agreement]. This centralized reliance on a single third-party provider severely reduces the freedoms of the Bitcoin developer community. Furthermore, such vast centralization poses a singular threat to the Bitcoin paradigm as a whole. Suppose a hacker finds a crack in Coinbase-armor; all Off-Chain accounts will then be compromised! That hack would undermine all Coinbase-dependent tools and apps, thereby obliterating the trust of the casual Cryptocurrency enthusiast.
For Bitcoin to flourish, its anti-hierarchy principles must be applied to safe Off-Chain transactions. First and foremost, we need a new HACKER-PROOF protocol that can easily be executed by any experienced developer. Preferably, the protocol will be open-sourced for full reliability and transparency. The developer community must come to the consensus that the protocol itself remains unbreakable.
In this paper we present one such solution; the CryptoCubic (CC) Protocol. The CC Protocol employs MultiSig technology to safely transfer ownership of actual bitcoin addresses between individual users. In the following documentation we will describe in iterative detail the science behind our CryptoCubic technique, as well as all its individual steps. We will also discuss all possible theft-driven attacks against our system, and the how protocol intrinsically defends itself against such BlackHat exploitations. It is our aim to meticulously show how the CryptoCubic Protocol is hacker-proof in all significant ways.
DEFINING A HACKER-PROOF PROTOCOL
How does one rigorously demonstrate that a protocol is actually hacker-poof? Any non-trivial system may potentially be manipulated in a seemingly infinite number of permutations. Therefore, in order to confidently claim that a protocol is safe, one must first define the settings under which that safety is guaranteed. One must lay down the rules of the game, so to speak, in order to then demonstrate that these rules are inherently unbreakable.
We begin to define the rules through a series of simple assumptions. First and foremost, we assume that the server is benign, and not malicious. The server does not purposefully attempt to cheat or manipulate its users. Second of all, we assume that the server executes the protocol exactly as specified; no unauthorized alterations or modifications are allowed. Furthermore, we assume the presence of a security apparatus capable of immediately detecting any deviations from the protocol. That is, if a malicious agent gains server access and modifies the code, then protocol execution will immediately terminate until the intrusion is resolved. Finally, we assume any calculated variables occurring within an running program are wholly inaccessible outside the boundary of that program. For example, if an on-server program dynamical computes some secret variable X, then that variable shall remain hidden from the world until it is specifically outputted to a memory-location on the server.
Additionally, let us consider one other significant supposition. We conjecture it is possible to design a simple so-called "self-destructive" storage mechanism that is 100% secure. What is a self-destructive storage mechanism? Imagine a database table whose content is limited to a certain pre-specified Source X. Output requests to the rows in that table may come from multiple unspecified sources. We may ping a particular row from the table to check if its empty or not. However, accessing the data in that row leads to the data's immediate deletion. Afterwards, the data may not be replaced without the deliberate permission of Source X. Let us consider an actual example; X produces Y, and stores Y in a self-destructive database. That action is represented as X-- [Y] . We ping the database to determine that Y is indeed present, though we do not know its contents. Next, we input a retrieval request for Y in order to obtain its true identity . Y is immediately retrieved, and is automatically deleted from the database. We may try to manipulate the system in order to subtly put Y back its original location, but we will not succeed without the direct permission of resource X. That, in a nutshell, is the function of a self-destructive database. Though its maximal level of proven security remains to be determined, we venture to conjecture that a totally secure self-destructive mechanism is mathematically possible.
Based on the above-stated assumptions, the server acts as a trusted third-party to its users. The server is also a potential target for malicious hackers and thieves. In fact, we shall directly associate hacking with theft. Hackers will willfully attack the server for the purpose of financial gain. Under such conditions, wanton and profit-less destruction is not considering hacking. Deletion of a server's contents is not a hack. Neither is smashing that server with a sledgehammer. We define such destructive activities as acts of vandalism. Defending against vandalism requires a secure system of storage and backup, which will not be discussed in this paper. We will focus instead on for-profit attacks. Our concern is the thief breaking into the vault, not the arsonist trying to burn down the bank.
Thus we define a hacking attack as a deliberate attempt to manipulate the protocol for the purpose of illicit financial gain. A successful hack entails that an attacker illicitly obtains all necessary crypo-keys needed to execute an On-Chain Bitcoin transaction. These keys may be obtained in a variety of ways; ranging from the direct replication of server-stored data to the more subtle counterfeit emulation of protocol-specific signals. A hacker-proof protocol must successfully defend against all these myriad attacks. We shall hence develop one such protocol in the subsequent sections of our paper.
In a standard Bitcoin transaction, a single private key is required to transfer funds from User_A to User_B. Whoever holds that key controls the funds, therby making it a dangerous single-point target for digital attacks. The onset of Bitcoin-based MultiSig cryptography greatly helps alleviate that threat. Let us a consider simple 2-of-2 MultiSig system. Two unique private keys, Sig_U and Sig_S, are associated with a single public address ADD. Both keys are required to control the funds within that address. Illicitly obtaining one but not the other private key is not enough to instigate the hack.
Suppose that we instigate a new relationship between User_A and Server_S. The Server then creates a 2-of-2 MultiSig key-pair associated with an address ADD. The key-pair and the address exist within a dynamic running process. They have not yet been stored in server memory, and are not accessible to predatory hackers, based on our predefined criteria. We represent this transitory state using notation <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD>. At this point in our execution, the memory states of User_A and Server_S exist as follows:
Next, Server_S establishes a secure connection with User_A. Sig_U and ADD are transferred over to User_A, to be stored in his protocol client's memory.
USER_A SERVER_S Sig_U <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> ADD Afterwards, Sig_S is transferred to the memory of the Server. Given the sensitive nature of Sig_S, we choose to treat its storage very careful. As a result, we load Sig_S into a self-destructive database; of the sort that is discussed in Section 2. That transfer is represented as <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> -- [Sig_S] , where <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> is a permited self-destructive database input source.
USER_A SERVER_S
Finally, the dynamic procedure containing the variables <Sig_U,Sig_S,ADD> reaches termination. The temporary variables cease to exist in any form within the Server. Server_S is left completely unaware of the contents of private key Sig_U.

Sig_U
[Sig_S] ADD At this point, User_A executes an On-Chain Bitcoin transaction from an exterior wallet, thereby transferring $10 to address ADD. Once User_B obtains Sig_S, he will gain instantaneous control of the $10 in address ADD. What we have just described is MultiSig Off-Chain transaction. Of course, the aforementioned transaction is exceedingly insecure. There are many reasons for this, but the foremost cause of insecurity is the unreliability of User_A. What if User_A grabs Sig_S from Server_S after the
USER_A SERVER_S
